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Abstract 
The relationship between politics and business is obviously a key feature of 
policy-making in capitalist democracies, and business associations are an 
important element of that relationship.  A consensus has now emerged that 
organised business is remarkably weak in East-Central Europe.  This article 
proposes a theoretical synthesis with which to explain that weakness.  It 
shows how the strength of trade unions, varieties of capitalism and interest 
diversity are specifications of Olson’s logic of collective action, specifications 
without which the logic itself is too general to explain concrete outcomes.  
Detailed evidence in favour of the theory is provided from the Polish case.  It 
is argued that the analysis should also apply to other post-communist 
countries. 
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1. POST-COMMUNIST BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
The role of business interests is a vital element of politics in any capitalist democracy.   
The nature of the interface between politics and business is particularly interesting in 
post-communist societies.  The communist regime was defined by the, largely 
successful, abolition of an independent business sphere which was swallowed up by 
the political system.  The post-communist transformation is most unique in its attempt 
to create a new independent business sphere and a new relationship between that 
sphere and the political system.  Business associations are usually crucial actors in the 
interaction of the economic and political systems.  However, it is now becoming clear 
that, in East-Central Europe, they are important more in their absence than in their 
presence (Draus 2000).  Obviously patterns vary across the region but relative 
weakness seems to be a general pattern.  The latest research suggests that this applies 
even to the Czech Republic which had been initially trumpeted as an example of post-
communist corporatism (Myant, Slocock and Smith 2000).   
 
The weakness of organised business has several fascinating implications for East-
Central European political economy.  There is a well-demonstrated association 
between corporatism and consensus democracy.  East-Central Europe will now join 
Italy and Portugal as clear consensus democracies with relatively pluralist interest 
group politics.  Soskice has recently made a powerful argument that the level of 
business co-ordination is the key factor in determining the type of political economy 
and, even the sources of comparative advantage, in a given country.  This suggests 
that East-Central Europe may now be joining the ranks of the liberal market 
economies, hitherto a minority in the European Union.  The weakness of organised 
business means that business has to find other ways into the political system.  The 
most frequent alternative seems to be the exploitation of personal connections, which 
has an obvious affinity with the corruption that has now become such a problem in 
East-Central Europe. 
 
Although there may be a clear consensus that the level of political mobilisation is 
important and an emerging consensus that its level of mobilisation is low, there is no 
such consensus on a theoretical framework with which to explain post-communist 
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collective inaction.  This article aims to present a convincing explanation based on 
economic factors alone.  It does so by presenting a theoretical synthesis based on 
Olson’s famous logic of collective action.  Three other approaches, which stress 
economic factors, are shown to be more specific variants of the logic of collective 
action: the role of labour unions, varieties of capitalism, and interest diversity.  The 
theory is backed up by evidence from Poland, which takes issue with common 
interpretations of both Polish political economy in particular, and post-communist 
business-government relations in general.  The logic of collective action and its more 
specific variants all present huge obstacles to capitalist collective action in Poland.   
 
Section 2 discusses the most powerful theories applicable to post-communist capitalist 
collective action.  Section 3 introduces the weak and fragmented structure of business 
association in Poland.  Section 4 applies the theoretical framework to Poland.  A 
variety of primary and secondary and qualitative and quantitative sources are used.  
Any methodological issues are noted as they arise.  Section 5 assesses the extent to 
which the Polish analysis may be generalisable to other cases in the region and 
Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. FOUR THEORIES – ONE LOGIC 
2.1 Olson’s Logic of Collective Action 
The basis of Olson’s argument is the distinction between public and private goods.  
The key feature of a public good is that if one member of a group “consumes it, it 
cannot feasibly be withheld from others in that group” (Olson 1971: 14). A private 
good is simply the converse: if one person consumes it there is nothing to stop it 
being withheld from other members of a group.  Someone can enjoy a public good 
whether they have contributed to its supply or not.   It is not rational for an individual 
to contribute to the provision of a public good unless she thinks that her portion of the 
increase in the supply of the good due to her efforts will be greater than the cost of 
her contribution to its supply.  The likelihood that an individual will calculate that 
their contribution will make a sufficiently large difference to the supply of a public 
good is basically a function of group size.  This is the first key independent variable 
identified by the logic of collective action. 
 
  4
Olson distinguished three types of groups. A latent group is a group for which “if one 
member does or does not [participate in collective action] no other one member will 
be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react”.  As such, latent 
groups are very unlikely to form the basis of collective action and the formation of a 
business association.  Intermediate groups do not “have so many members that no one 
member will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the 
collective good”.  This makes it much more likely that collective action will happen.  
Finally, there are “privileged groups” in which a single member has sufficient 
incentive to set up a business association.  (Olson 1971: 50) 
 
Since the vast majority of politically relevant groups are latent groups this theory 
predicts there will be very few interest associations.  However, Olson is well aware 
that a large number of latent groups have in fact managed to mobilise interest 
associations.  He explains this by reference to private goods which enable those “who 
[do not] contribute to the attainment of the group’s interest [to] be treated differently 
from those who do” (Olson 1971: 57).  Olson sees private goods as exclusively 
economic rather than political and as such they are the basis of the “by-product” 
theory.  Members do not join a group because they support its political aims.  
According to Olson’s account they might even violently disagree with them!  
Members join because of the private economic goods.  Thus, the political activities of 
interest groups are a by-product of their delivery of private economic goods.  The 
balance of public and private goods provided by an association is the second key 
independent variable proposed by the logic of collective action. 
 
The third key independent variable is the size of the enterprises.  The basic cost-
benefit calculation is quite different for small enterprises (Moe 1980: 255; Van 
Waarden 1991: 70; Grant and Marsh 1977: 36).   Firstly, small enterprises have 
limited resources and almost always have to contribute a greater proportion of their 
resources in money, secondments, volunteer work, etc., than do large enterprises.  
However, although their contribution is proportionally larger the chances that their 
contribution will make a difference to the provision of public goods is much smaller.   
 
Private goods often present a greater incentive for association membership for small 
enterprises than they do for large enterprises.  The services provided by associations 
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are frequently functions that large enterprises can afford to provide in-house or 
purchase in the market.  In contrast, small enterprises are not able to provide 
themselves with various ancillary functions and perceive a great benefit from having 
them provided by an association.  This does not mean that small enterprises flood into 
interest associations.  Firstly, service-providers that are not subsidising political 
activities can undercut interest associations and it is from consultancies and such like 
that small enterprises often purchase specialised services (McLean 2000; Padgett 
2000: 120).  Secondly, the competitive provision of services necessitates considerable 
resources which are not likely to be provided if an association is dependent on the 
very small contributions that small enterprises are prepared to make.  This is a vicious 
circle in which many associations are trapped: to recruit members they need to 
provide private goods, to provide private goods they need an organisational 
infrastructure but they cannot build an infrastructure until they have recruited 
members to provide resources. 
 
Size also influences whether a cost-benefit calculation is made in the first place.  For 
large enterprises, the decision to join, and more frequently the decision to remain a 
member, may not cross the threshold of rationality (Olson 1982: 28; Grant and Marsh 
1977: 49-50; Greenwood 2000).  The low level of the contribution to the association 
may not be enough to justify the trouble of making cost-benefit calculation on 
whether it should be made or not.  However, since contributions to associations will 
be proportionally larger for small enterprises they will apply a much more strict cost-
benefit analysis to association membership.   
 
Lastly, small enterprises are strongly associated with large groups.  Where there are 
few enterprises in an industry those enterprises are also likely to be large.  Where 
there are lots of enterprises in an industry the vast majority of those enterprises are 
likely to be small.  Therefore, small enterprises are more likely to be members of 
latent groups and large enterprises are more likely to be members of intermediate and 
privileged groups.   
 
The above account is predicated upon two unrealistic assumptions.  In the language of 
economics, the first assumption is that an individual has “perfect information”: this 
means that individuals will correctly calculate the costs and benefits of their 
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contribution to an interest association.  However, frequently they do not do so.  Many 
businesspeople will have what Moe calls an exaggerated perception of “self-efficacy”, 
i.e. they overestimate the likelihood that their personal contribution will make a 
difference (Moe 1980).  The second unrealistic assumption is that the decision to 
participate in interest associations is motivated solely by economic self-interest.  If 
non-economic motivations are allowed there is an almost endless range of types of 
goods which can motivate participation in an interest association. 
 
The distinction between public and private goods is a vital one and Olson’s approach 
is powerful, even if the assumptions of perfect information and economic self-interest 
are dropped.  Interest associations may not be made up of members who disagree with 
their political aims and many latent groups may manage to mobilise.  While these 
extreme predictions may not be borne out by the evidence, the three independent 
variables of the number and size of enterprises and the mix of public and private 
goods are vital factors in explaining the degree to which interest associations actually 
get organised.  The size of the enterprises in the economy is a straightforward variable 
to assess.  The other two variables are not so straightforward.  The size of the group is 
ultimately subjective, and it will vary depending on which issues are perceived to be 
salient.  Similarly, the balance of public and private goods provided by associations 
will partly depend on the quality of the association’s enterpreneurship in meeting, and 
even, creating a demand for services.  However, both of these factors are also subject 
to the influence of objective features of the economic environment.  Three such 
features, which can be applied to the post-communist context, are trade unions, 
varieties of capitalism and interest diversity.  The next sections aim to show how 
these characteristics of the economy are specifications of the variables of group size 
and the balance of public and private goods that are part of the general logic of 
collective action.  
 
2.2 Trade Unions 
Business associations are often seen as a reaction to the strength of trade unions.  It is 
important to distinguish between the political and economic power of labour unions.  
If unions have labour market power they will be relevant to business at the level of 
sectors and regions and will stimulate the formation of business associations at those 
levels.  If unions have political power they will be relevant to business at the level of a 
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political territory.  In most countries the political territory contains many times more 
businesses than are to be found in a particular sector or region.  If unions have 
political power alone, the opposing business constituency is likely to be a latent group 
and, therefore, likely to produce weak business associations.  Indeed, the business 
constituency will usually comprise the whole business class.  If unions have labour 
market power the opposing business constituencies are likely to be defined by sector 
and region.  These will constitute intermediate, or even privileged, groups and are 
much more likely to result in strong business associations.   Moreover, if business 
faces the labour market power of trade unions, associations will be able to provide 
important industrial relations services such as legal and mediation consultancy.  In 
contrast, if it is only the political power of trade unions that is relevant there will be 
very few opportunities to provide trade-union related services.  Labour market power 
means that business associations can offer important private goods while political 
power alone does not increase the potential for private goods.  Unions tend to be 
much stronger in large enterprises than in small enterprises.  In fact, they are usually 
completely absent from small enterprises.  Therefore, the labour market power of 
unions faces a promising constituency for collective action amongst large enterprises.  
Even though small enterprises may not be faced with unions in the workplace the 
political power of unions may be an issue for them in terms of legislation that impacts 
on workplaces whether unions are present are not.  Of course, this constituency of 
small enterprises is not a promising one for collective action.   
 
2.3 Varieties of capitalism 
In recent years, the literature has shifted away from the tendency to view business 
associations as merely a reaction to trade union power.  Soskice argues that the type 
of economic activity in which a business is engaged is likely to affect the potential for 
business association.  He sums up the most profound differences between types of 
businesses in the notion of a “production regime”.  According to this account business 
associations do not reflect the structure of labour unions, but rather labour unions are 
part of an overall institutional structure, the nature of which is largely determined by 
the nature of the production regime.  In other words, business decides on union 
structure, not the other way round (Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001).   
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Soskice distinguishes between co-ordinated and liberal market economies.  In co-
ordinated economies, there is a rich structure of institutional co-operation between 
enterprises, amongst which relatively corporatist business associations play a vital 
part.  In this sort of system, business associations have a key role in the economic 
activity of the firm, in regulation, technology transfer, training, etc.  By contrast, in 
liberal market economies there is much less inter-firm co-operation.  Business 
associations are much less relevant to the firms’ economic activity and tend to be 
restricted to a narrower lobbying function.  This narrower lobbying role means that 
there is less incentive for business associations to encompass and monopolise the 
representation of their business constituencies.   
 
In terms of the logic of collective action, in co-ordinated economies the most relevant 
group for business is likely to be a sector or sub-sector.  Sectors, in turn, are likely to 
be intermediate groups with good collective action potential.  Because of their 
integration in the production processes of the firms business associations in 
coordinated economies are likely to provide private goods which are absolutely 
central to their member firms’ activities.  In liberal economies, these small groups are 
less likely to be important and business is more likely to identify with a latent group 
like the business class as a whole.  In this case, there is likely to be less potential for 
private goods which are so vital to the firm’s profits.  Furthermore, co-ordinated 
economies tend to have relatively large numbers of medium-sized enterprises.  These 
enterprises are large enough to be motivated by public goods but also small enough to 
be motivated by private goods.  In liberal economies there is more of a contrast 
between large enterprises which are interested primarily in public goods and small 
enterprises which are really only interested in private goods.   
 
2.4 Interest diversity 
Padgett makes an interesting argument about interest diversity amongst post-
communist businesses.  He argues that there are so many sources of division in post-
communist business that this hinders collective action, resulting in small weak 
associations: 
[C]leavages between state and private sectors, large and small firms, indigenous and foreign 
capital, and the liberal and ‘nomenklatura bourgeoisie’ are replicated in organisational activity 
(Padgett 2000: 10). 
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This suggests that there are no coherent constituencies for business associations.  
Groups of businesses with enough in common to justify the foundation of a business 
association are so small that there is no need for such formal co-ordination: a handful 
of enterprises can easily co-operate on an informal basis.  At its most extreme, if an 
enterprise is separated from other enterprises by a variety of cleavages only 
individual action makes sense.  Ultimately, the salience of these multiple cleavages 
means that there is also no overall business class interest or identity (Padgett 2000: 1, 
53).  This argument about interest diversity can also be interpreted in terms of the 
Olsonian focus on the size of the group.  Basically, it argues that groups will tend to 
have one member, or that there are no groups and therefore collective action makes 
no sense. 
 
2.4 Theoretical synthesis 
Figure 1 (page 21) summarises the above arguments about economic influences on 
business association.  When there are very large numbers of enterprises which share 
the same interest this constitutes a latent group which makes collective action 
problematic.  The ultimate latent group for businesspeople is their overall class 
position.  This class position is most well-defined in opposition to labour movements 
with influence at the level of national politics.  In liberal market economies business 
tends to view itself as a class seeking maximum freedom from restraint by labour law 
and labour unions and eschewing state support for sectoral systems of business co-
ordination.  The business class is the level which emphasises maximum interest 
homogeneity across the national economy as a whole.  There are very restricted 
possibilities for the offer of private goods at such a general level.  At the class level 
the vast majority of businesses are small. 
 
Intermediate groups are those where the non-cooperation of a single enterprise may be 
noticed and sanctioned by others, thereby making collective action much more likely.  
Sectoral or regional business associations are likely to constitute intermediate groups.  
If unions have strong labour market power they are likely to stimulate business 
association at the sectoral or regional levels.  Similarly, co-ordinated market 
economies tend to emphasise the sectoral level at which associations can co-ordinate 
both the political and economic activities of their members.  This type of economy 
represents a moderate focus on interest diversity.  Sectoral interest is more important 
  10
than class interest.  At the level of sectoral interest there is considerable potential for 
offering attractive private goods to members.  Medium-sized enterprises are well-
represented in economies with strong sectoral interests and identities. 
 
Finally, there is the situation in which only individual action is rational: there is no 
relevant group with which an enterprise can contemplate collective action.  This is a 
situation of maximum interest diversity and is the logical extreme of Padgett’s 
argument.  This section has shown that arguments about unions, production regimes 
and interest diversity can be adequately incorporated into Olson’s trio of group size, 
private goods, and enterprise size.  Section 4 will show how this theoretical synthesis 
is supported by evidence from Poland.  The next section briefly describes the situation 
of Polish business associations.  
 
3.  BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN POLAND 
Business associations have a weak presence amongst businesspeople.  One survey 
found that over 35 per cent of heads of firms claimed never to have heard of any 
organisation representing employers (Institute of Public Affairs 2000: 7).1  It seems 
highly unlikely that more than ten per cent of Polish enterprises are members of a 
business association.2  Polish employer organisations have, on average, just one 
employee and are heavily dependent on membership fees and the contributions of 
                                                 
1 Telephone interviews with owners/president/vice-presidents of firms.  60% were private enterprises; 
33% from Warsaw; 33% from towns of over 100,000 inhabitants; 33% from towns of between 20,000 
– 100,000 inhabitants.  The sample represents the 8 main categories of the European Classification of 
Economic Activity.  No response rate given. 
2 The Institute of Public Affairs survey described above found that 8% of enterprises with 20 
employees or less were members of business associations.  Since approximately 95% of Polish 
enterprises are about this size or smaller ten per cent seems to be a safe upper limit.   
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volunteers to survive (Nalecz 2000).3  These weak organisations are divided amongst 
themselves.  At least five groups are plausible rivals for the title of chief 
representative of Polish business (Jasiecki 1999: 7; Kozek 1999: 86). Peak 
associations organise a small minority of the relevant primary associations 
(Konfederacja Pracodawców Polskich 1999; Sąd Wojewódzki 1999a, 1999b; Krajowa 
Izba Gospodarza 1999; Sąd Gospodarczy 1999). Just as the associations have a weak 
and divided presence amongst businesspeople they are rarely central actors in politics 
(Keat 2000: 212).  Only 3.1 per cent of deputies in the Second Sejm (1993-97) felt 
that employer organisations had a great influence on their work (Wesołowski and Post 
1998: 188).  The principal peak associations, and many sectoral associations, are 
frequently consulted by the government on new bills, but they have no right to be 
consulted and often do not hear about a bill until it is published.  There is a tripartite 
commission, which, in theory, gives great power to collective business.  However, its 
only concrete power is the setting of wages in the “budget sector”.  There is only one 
real employer in this sector – the state – and this means that employer associations are 
marginalized.4  Even representatives of the top business associations find it difficult to 
think of a recent policy success.5  The next section uses the theoretical framework 
introduced earlier to explain the weak mobilisation of Polish business. 
 
                                                 
3 Analysis of SOF census of the Polish Central Statistical Office in 1998.  The questionnaire was sent 
to all 109 employers organisations with bank accounts.  67 replied, 22 refused, 6 were inactive and 
nothing is known about 14.  It was assumed that the 22 refusals were similar to the 67 respondents on 
the basis of similar research on Polish non-profit organisations. 
4 Interview: Dagmir Długosz, 2 July 2002.  This was one 21 interviews with business leaders and 
politicians carried out by the author between 1999 and 2002.  The business leaders came from the five 
most influential business associations and represented a the full  range of backgrounds under the 
communist regime (opposition, old regime, émigré, private business, and intelligentsia) and a wide 
range of sectors (state, private, privatised, large, small, sundown, sunrise, mining, manufacturing, 
services).  Six politicians, with a special interest in business, from various parties, as well as a trade-
unionist and three professional lobbyists were also interviewed.  
5 Interview: Marek Kłoczko, 30 June 2000 
  12
4. EXPLAINING CAPITALIST INACTION IN POLAND 
 
4.1 The size of Polish enterprises 
As in all capitalist economies, the vast majority of Poland’s enterprises are small.  
However, the proportion is even greater than average in Poland, partly because there 
are relatively few medium-sized enterprises.  However, where Poland is really 
unusual is that within the category of small enterprises, ninety-five per cent are both 
legally and literally sole traders (Bąk, 1999; Rzeczpospolita, Ekonomia, 12 July 
2002).  This suggests that capitalist collective action in Poland will be problematic to 
say the least.  However, the extreme weakness of collective Polish business is further 
explained by the definition of the size of the relevant group and the opportunities for 
the provision of vital public and private goods.  Both of these variables are clearly 
explained by an examination of the role of trade unions, varieties of capitalism and 
interest diversity. 
 
4.2 Trade unions in Poland 
The representation of Polish trade unions is weak in the labour market. Union 
membership has been in free fall since the collapse of communism, as Table 1 shows. 
 
Table 1: Trade Union Membership in Poland 
Federation 1990-91 1993 1995 
Solidarity 2.2m 1.5m 1.3m 
OPZZ 6m 4.8m 2.5m 
Source: Kubicek 1999: 86.  Self-reported data, collected by author, ILO or state committees. 
 
 
In 1995 the overall union density was estimated to be about 35 per cent.  Membership 
has continued to fall fast.  By 1997 it was estimated to be 23 per cent (Padgett 2000: 
78) and by 2000 20 per cent (Rzeczpospolita, Plus Minus, 19 August 2000).  The fall 
in the membership of the All-Polish Agreement of Trade Unions (OPZZ) has been 
particularly precipitous in recent years (Rzeczpospolita, Kraj, 27 May 2002).  None of 
these figures is likely to be exact but the overall picture is clear.  The research of 
Gardawski has shown that membership of Polish unions is high and stable in the state 
sector, is being eroded in privatised firms, and is virtually non-existent in new private 
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and small firms (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 14-15).6  The 
central federations, the post-communist OPZZ and Solidarity, are fiercely antagonistic 
at the level of national politics.  Relationships at the local level tend to be more 
pragmatic, but co-operation is limited.  Both federations have very loose structures.  
Unions in the workplace have very little contact with, and regard for, the national 
leadership and the regional and sectoral divisions of the federations Gardawski, 
Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 17, 20, 168).  There are also many 
independent unions.  The most significant of these are radical offshoots of Solidarity – 
Solidarity ’80 and Solidarity August ’80.   The majority of unionised enterprises have 
only one union (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 234).  Where 
this is not the case, the law tends to calcify the fragmentation of unions by insisting 
that unions work together.  In practice, they frequently do not manage to do so and 
unions are marginalised.  The leader of Solidarity’s public services branch says: 
At the plant level many trade unions are registered.  When there’s a real gamut of trade unions it 
is hard for them to come to agreement among themselves.  There is just too much pluralism and 
this does not help the representation of workers.7   
 
Overall, Polish unions are relatively passive.  Workers and unionists have great 
respect for managers and rarely seem to think they can or should take part in the 
running of the firm (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 172; Ost and 
Weinstein 1999).  Unions play little or no role in decision-making in firms.  Their role 
is greatest in safety and hygiene, layoffs and bonuses.  Collective bargaining 
agreements were in place in one third of the workplaces in Gardawski’s sample 
(Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 21).  Collective bargaining 
                                                 
6 The information is based on a sample of 202 workplaces from 1998, drawn from the food, wood and 
paper, chemical, car, building, education, healthcare and social assistance sectors.  202 directors or 
another members of the management was interviewed, as were 148 union activists, and 1225 other 
workers, whether union members or not. The number of workers surveyed was proportionate to the size 
of the enterprise.  Almost half of the places of work had less than 50 employees.  41.5% had between 
50 and 250 employees and 8.5% had over 250 employees.  Almost half of the workplaces were private 
or privatized.  No response rate given.  (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 13) 
7 Interview: Jerzy Wielgus, 13 December 2000 
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beyond the level of the individual workplace is extremely rare in Poland and formal 
agreements are confined to a handful of state sectors.  Relationships between unions 
and employers are rarely conflictual in Poland.  In one-third of the workplaces in 
Gardawski’s sample strike notice had been served in the last decade and in one-fifth 
strikes had actually taken place.  The number of working days lost to strikes in 1990 
was 141,304 but had fallen to 25,894 by 1997 (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2000).  
The vast majority of conflict takes place in a limited number of state sectors.  Workers 
do not consider their unions very useful.  When they have a problem, workers tend to 
go straight to the management rather than through their union (Gardawski, Gąciarz, 
Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 244).  When given a list of statements describing the 
role of unions workers most frequently chose, “They try but they do not achieve 
much” (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, Panków 1999: 20). 
 
However, unions do have considerable influence at the level of national politics.  In 
the third Sejm 106 out of the 460 members of the Sejm were directly connected to 
unions (Kolankiewicz 1998).  Many Poles, and especially business leaders, think that 
Poland is a country run by unions.  They have even coined the term “Związokracja” 
(Rule of the Unions).  The following discussion argues that this view is an 
exaggeration. 
 
Solidarity cannot be straightforwardly treated as a union.  It has always had a much 
wider political agenda (Jackiewicz 1996).  At both the grassroots and elite levels the 
political and trade union Solidarities were difficult to extricate.  Local party 
organisations were largely based on existing union facilities.  The top officials of 
Solidarity sat in the Sejm and some entered government.  The Solidarity Electoral 
Action bloc, which ruled from 1997 to 2001, was dominated by Solidarity president 
Marian Krzaklewski.  Perhaps the most obvious example of union influence during its 
time in power was legislation on shortening the working week.  Previous governments 
had passed various laws which gave some privileges to unions, such as enhanced job 
security for union officials (Majtas 1999: 27-28).  However, the overall thrust of 
Solidarity government policy had nothing to do with the rights of unionists and 
workers.  The bloc also contained other parties, like the People’s Conservative Party, 
who wanted to restrict union influence on policy.  Many of the Solidarity 
representatives had a much stronger commitment to the acceleration of socio-
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economic reform than they had to the promotion of workers or union interests.  One 
common explanation for the decline of Polish unions is the “umbrella” provided by 
Solidarity to radical reforms after the transition of 1989 and again during the third 
Sejm.  The chaotic record of the government, Krzaklewski’s pathetic campaign for the 
Polish presidency and the electoral wipeout suffered by Solidarity Electoral Action in 
2001 may mean the end of direct involvement in politics for the Solidarity union.   
 
The relationship between the OPZZ and the post-communist Democratic Left (SLD) 
is more straightforward.  Again, senior officials sit in the Sejm and enter government.  
They tend towards a more direct representation of union interests than Solidarity.  
Although the Democratic Left calls itself social-democratic and advocates many 
social-democratic policies it is also a party of business, especially big business.  Many 
of the senior members of the party come from the pro-business wing of the party.  
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the party and its leadership is its 
pragmatism.  It is as much a party of power as a left-wing union-based party.  In both 
the SLD and AWS large swathes of the parties were unhappy with their close 
relationship with the unions and were working to undermine it or reconstruct it on a 
more distant basis (Panków 1999; Panków 2000). 
 
The constituencies of businesses with an interest in the presence of trade unions in the 
labour market may be quite small, territorially and/or sectorally, and thus provide 
good incentives for collective action.  The constituency for trade union political 
power is the most latent of latent groups since it relates to virtually every business 
under the jurisdiction of the Polish State.  Thus, Polish trade unions are weak where 
they are most likely to encourage strong business association and strong where they 
are least likely to encourage business association.  Polish business leaders are tortured 
by “frustrated functionalism”.  They see trade union power as deeply damaging to the 
business class and think that the common interest of business this represents would 
lead to strong business associations if only Polish businesspeople understood their 
interests properly:  
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Many Polish businessmen do not know what is good for them.  They lack an education in 
economics and do not understand that they need to join together to resist the trade unions and 
promote free-market policies.8   
However, looked at from the Olsonian perspective, the weakness of the business 
associations makes perfect sense and seems unlikely to be overcome because of trade 
union power in national politics.  The weakness of trade unions in the labour market 
also means that few business associations can recruit members by offering industrial 
relations services.  Finally, unions are to be found in the most concentrated sectors 
with the largest enterprises, that is, in the state sector.  In fact, much of their presence 
is in the budget sector where there is only one giant employer, the central state itself.  
In the case of groups which are already intermediate or privileged the presence of 
trade unions may not be an especially large extra incentive to collective action. 
 
The above argument is that trade unions are not a major stimulus to business 
association in Poland.  The foundation of the Polish Confederation of Private 
Employers is a good example of the exception that proves the rule.  Its origins relate 
quite directly to the distinction between the labour market and political power of trade 
unions.  In most countries, unions provoked business association because business 
wanted to take on locally or sectorally based unions at the same level, that is to say 
that the labour market power of unions stimulated the formation of business 
associations.  These locally based unions then federated, eventually forming national 
peak associations which dealt with wider political issues.  In the case of the Private 
Confederation it was the other way round.  The power of the trade unions is in the 
political system so a confederation that could be influential at that level was needed.  
However, a confederation cannot legally be set up unless it has the required number 
of associations as members.  Since these were lacking, the Confederation’s founders 
set up several associations in order to overcome this hurdle.  Since it was the political 
and not the labour market power of unions which was the target, the peak association 
came first and was then followed by the primary associations.  This is in contrast to 
most West European countries in which local and sectoral associations were set up to 
counter the labour market power of unions, only considerably later forming into 
national confederations (Windmuller and Gladstone 1980: 3).  While the Private 
                                                 
8 Interview: Jeremi Mordasewicz, 9 August 2000 
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Confederation has been fairly successful in partially supplanting the official 
Confederation, it has not managed to mobilise the latent group of the Polish national 
business class against trade union political power.   
 
4.3 The Polish variety of capitalism 
Another popular economic approach to business associations plays down the role of 
trade unions and argues that the mode or production is the key independent variable.  
The vital distinction here is between coordinated and liberal economies.  Coordinated 
economies are exemplified by highly skilled and specialised sectors which encourage 
business association.   Liberal economies stress the flexibility necessary for industries 
where radical innovation and/or low wages are necessary and business associations 
are relatively superfluous.   Poland’s comparative advantage is to be found in low-
skill, low value-added sectors, which are the very antithesis of the “coordinated” 
production regime (OECD 1998).  In these sectors, there is little need for technical 
and training cooperation and therefore a low potential for business associations to 
offer private goods which are so essential that they form part of the production 
process itself.  It has been noted by the Polish Foundation for the Development of 
Small and Medium Enterprises that Polish business associations are virtually never 
involved in “carrying out work connected with the certification of products or the 
conduct of research and innovation activity” (Businessman November 2000: 16). 
 
4.4 Interest diversity and Polish business assocations 
The final economic approach focuses on interest diversity, a variable for which there 
is no worthwhile general data.   If there is a very high level of interest diversity 
amongst post-communist business classes, as Padgett supposes, then divisions 
between and within business associations should be based on objective factors, like 
the sectors of the businesses, their ownership structure, and the background of their 
management.  Little of the competition between the Poland’s five most influential 
business associations seems to be based on fundamental differences in their 
membership.  The big exception here is the competition between the Confederation of 
Polish Employers and the Polish Confederation of Private Employers.  The Private 
Confederation claims that this is a straightforward opposition between the state and 
private sectors.  This is a great exaggeration since the vast majority of the 
Confederation of Polish Employers’ members are private and all of its presidents have 
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been from the private sector.  On the other hand, there is no doubt that the state sector 
has had an influence out of proportion of its share of the membership and there has 
been a good deal of conflict between state and private sectors within the 
Confederation.   However, this does not mean that the private sector has been ignored 
or that the organisation can simply be described as a state-sector lobby.   It is also 
important to note that by far the biggest employer in the Private Confederation, the 
Polish Copper Association, is largely state-owned.   
 
As regards the other associations, while they have fairly different membership 
profiles, most of their competition relates to personality and valence issues.  Their 
attacks on each other consist of accusations of incompetence, careerism and 
corruption.  Very rarely do they describe their competitors as representatives of big 
business, the state sector, foreign firms, or the former nomenklatura.  Similarly, there 
is little sign of competition within associations based on objective factors.  In the 
Polish Chamber of Commerce, which has the largest and most diverse membership, 
internal politics does often relate to differences between large and small business and 
occasionally foreign and domestic business.  However, these conflicts do not seem 
especially intense and are only to be expected from any interest association.  Internal 
politics in the Chamber seems to be much more focused on the competition of various 
personal cliques for power and position.  The Business Centre Club, Polish Business 
Roundtable and Private Confederation appear to suffer from very minimal internal 
conflict.  In the case of the Club, this is partly because it is effectively a firm 
controlled by one man.  The Roundtable and the Confederation are based on a tightly-
knit core of business leaders with similar views and interests.  This relative lack of 
conflict on the basis of objective factors suggests that Polish business associations 
consider themselves as fundamentally one large latent group.  Their problems do not 
seem to be conflicts between mobilised groups with fundamentally different interests.  
Their fundamental problem is the mobilisation of latent groups with common 
interests.   
 
5. GENERALISING FROM THE POLISH CASE 
This section compares Poland with its post-communist neighbours, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, to see whether the relationships between the variables in the 
Polish case extend more generally.  On the dependent variable, the collective action of 
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business, the Czech Republic and Hungary seem broadly similar to Poland.  The best 
source is almost certainly Padgett’s careful review of the secondary literature.  He 
refutes the view that post-communist tripartism in any country approaches genuine 
corporatist exchange and describes them merely as “attempts by hard-pressed 
governments to legitimate the social costs of economic transformation” (Padgett 
2000: 3).   In spite of this, there can be little doubt that the much higher profile of 
business associations and tripartism in Hungary and Poland is, in some measure at 
least, indicative of more successful capitalist collective action in those states. 
 
Hungary and Czech Republic share Poland’s relatively high proportion of small 
enterprises (OECD 2000:  211-2).  However, it is not clear to what extent these are 
mostly micro-enterprises as in Poland.  In terms of union strength, Poland’s 
neighbours also show a precipitous decline in trade union membership.  Again there is 
a lack of good up-to-date data but it does seem that Hungarian and Czech unions have 
a somewhat more significant presence in the labour market than their Polish 
counterparts (ILO 1998).  The revealed comparative advantage of both countries 
shows that they, like Poland, are clearly not heavily reliant on the specialised 
manufacturing industries which are conducive to high levels of business co-ordination 
(OECD 1997: 63-67; International Trade Centre 2003).  The final variable is very 
hard to assess without a detailed qualitative knowledge of the cases in question.  
Padgett, again relying on a close reading of the literature, perceives a highly  
fragmented set of interests, the opposite of what this article found in Poland.  While 
there are important differences between Poland and its neighbours, the similarities 
seem sufficient for the analysis of this article to be applicable to other post-communist 
cases.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The lack of capitalist collective action in Poland can be powerfully explained by 
Olson’s trio of group size, enterprise size, and the balance of public and private 
goods.  However, the logic of collective action is too general to be a satisfying 
explanation.  The strength of trade unions, the variety of capitalism and interest 
diversity serve as convincing specifications of the logic in the particular context of 
post-communist collective action.  They provide clear information about group size 
and the availability of private goods which are not, and cannot, be provided by 
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Olson’s abstract theory.  Poland’s business associations seem weaker than those in 
neighbouring countries and the variables selected for this analysis tell a particularly 
emphatic story in that country.  Nonetheless, it seems that both this theoretical 
synthesis and its empirical conclusion are applicable to other post-communist 
capitalist democracies.  The fact that these economic variables seem to be sufficient in 
themselves to explain capitalist collective inaction is hugely significant.  It seems 
highly unlikely that these countries, or indeed any country, is likely to quickly and 
fundamentally to experience a large rise in the labour-market strength of trade unions, 
a fundamental shift in comparative advantage, or a wholesale change in the perception 
of common and divergent interests in the business class.  This means that any serious 
analyses of East-Central European politics must be prepared to accommodate and 
theorise a policy-making arena in which organised business is largely absent.  More 
practically, this is also something that the European Union itself may have to come to 
accept. 
 
  21
 
Weak 
Strong 
Latent 
Class 
Limited 
Intermediate / Privileged
Sector / Region 
Moderate 
Individual action
No relevant group 
Extreme 
 
 
Figure 1 Explanations for the strength of business associations 
Organisational 
Development of 
Interest 
Associations 
Collective Action Category (Size of Group) 
Definition of Group 
Interest Diversity across Economy
  22
 
REFERENCES 
Bąk, M. (ed) (1999) Raport o stanie sektor małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw w Polsce w latach 1997-98, 
Warsaw: Polska fundacja promocji i rozwoju małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw 
Businessman, November 2000 
Draus, F., Les organisations patronales dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale, Brussels: 
European Trade Union Institute 
Gardawski, J., Gąciarz, B., Mokrzyszewski, A., Panków, W. (1999) Rozpad Bastionu? Związki 
Zawodowe w gospodarce prywatyzowanej. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych 
Główny Urząd Statystyczny (2000) Rocznik StatystycznyRzeczpospolitej Polskiej 1999, Warsaw: 
Głowny Urząd Statystyczny 
Grant, W. and Marsh, D. (1977) The Confederation of British Industry, London: Hodder and Stoughton 
 
Greenwood, J. (2000) ‘Incentives and Disincentives for Collective Behaviour by Business in the EU: 
Business Collective Action and the Responses of Associations’.  Paper prepared for the 
Conference on the Effectiveness of EU Business Associations, Brussels, 18-22 September.  
Hall P. A. and Soskice, D. (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Institute of Public Affairs (2000) Raport z badania opinii na temat potrzeb istnienia i roli organizacji 
zrzeszających pracodawców. Unpublished.  Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs 
International Labour Organisation (1998) World Labour Report 1997-1998, Geneva: ILO 
International Trade Centre (2003), http://www.intracen.org/countries/htm99/cze.htm, 15 October 2003 
Jackiewicz, I. (1996). ‘Solidarity in a Double Role: Political Representative and Pressure Group’ in A. 
Ágh and G. Ilonszki, Parliaments and Organized Interests: The Second Steps, Budapest: 
Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies. 
Jasiecki, K. (1997) ‘Organizacje Pracodawców i Przedsiębiorców w Polsce’ in J. Wasilewski (ed), 
Zbiorowy Aktorzy Polskiej Polityki, Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of 
Sciences 
Keat, P. (2000) ‘Penalizing the reformers: Polish steel and European integration’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 33 (2), 201-221 
Kolankiewicz, George (1998) ‘Social Package to Social Consequences: Restructuring of Coal Mining 
in Poland’.  Paper prepared for the London School of Economics Post-Communist Politics 
Research Seminar. 
Konfederacja Pracodawców Polskich (1999) Wykaz Członków KPP, Warsaw: Konfederacja 
Pracodawców Polskich 
Kozek, W. (1999) Społeczne Organizacje Biznesu w Polsce a Stosunki Pracy, Warsaw: Centrum 
Partnerstwa Społecznego 
Krajowa Izba Gospodarza (1999) Wykaz Członków KIG, Warsaw: Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza. 
Kubicek, P. (1999), ‘Organized Labor in Postcommuist States: Will the Western Sun Set on It, Too?’, 
Comparative Politics, 32 (1): 83-102 
  23
Majtas, T. (1999) Prawo Pracy: Zarys Wykładu, Poznań: Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Bankowości w 
Poznańiu 
McLean, I. (2000) ‘The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson’, British Journal of Political Science, 30 (4): 
651-668 
Moe, T. (1980) The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political 
Interest Groups, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Myant, M., Slocock B. and Smith, S. (2000). ‘Tripartism in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, Europe-
Asia Studies, 52 (4): 723-739 
Nalecz, S. (2000) ‘Analysis of SOF census data on employer organisations’ Unpublished.  Warsaw: 
Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences 
Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press 
Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997) OECD Economic Surveys: 
Hungary, Paris: OECD   
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1998) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland, 
Paris: OECD   
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000) The OECD small and medium 
enterprise outlook, Paris: OECD   
Ost, D. and Weinstein, M. (1999) ‘Unionists Against Unions: Toward Hierarchical Management in 
Post-Communist Poland’, East European Politics and Societies, 13 (1): 1-33 
Padgett, S. (2000) Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest groups in post-communist 
society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Panków, I. (1999) ‘Związki zawodowe a polityka’ in J. Wasilewski (ed), Elita polityczna 1998, 
Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Panków, I. (2000). ‘Trade Unions and Politics’ in J. Frentzel-Zagórska and J. Wasilewski (eds.), The 
Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe, Warsaw: Institute of 
Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Rzeczpospolita, Plus Minus, 19 August 2000 
Rzecspospolita, Kraj, 27 May 2002 
Sąd Gospodarczy (1999) Rejestr Izb Gospodarczych, Unpublished, Warsaw: Sąd Gospodarczy Sądu 
Rejonowego dla miasta stołecznego Warszawy, 7 September 
Sąd Wojewódzki w Warszawie (1999a) Rejestr Związków Pracodawców “A”, Unpublished (Warsaw: 
Sąd Wojewódzki w Warszawie, VII Wydział Cywilny i Rejestrowy, 10 August 
Sąd Wojewódzki w Warszawie (1999b), Rejestr Związków Pracodawców “B”, Unpublished. Warsaw: 
Sąd Wojewódzki w Warszawie, VII Wydział Cywilny i Rejestrowy, 10 August 
Soskice, D. (1999) ‘Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market 
Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, J. D. Stephens (eds), 
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  24
Van Waarden, F. (1991) ‘Two Logics of Collective Action? Business Associations as Distinct from 
Trade Unions: The Problems of Associations of Organisations’ in D. Sadowski and O Jacobi 
(eds), Employers’ Associations in Europe: Policy and Organisation, Baden-Baden: 
Verlagsgesellschaft 
Wesołowski, W. and Post, B. (1998) Polityka i Sejm: formowanie się elity politycznej, Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 
Windmuller, J. P. and Gladstone, A. (1984) Employer Associations and Industrial Relations. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
